Anatolii Savchenko, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS, Vladivostok, Russia. E-mail: savich21@mail.ru.
This article gives a new insight into the Far East policy through the analysis of the state- oriented approach. A contemporary history of the Far East is examined within the framework of R. Collins’s geopolitical theory and M. Mann’s theory of the infrastructural power of the state. The theoretical analysis of the development of the Far East demonstrates that the territory potential is a variable that changes “pluses” into “minuses”, and expected benefits can easily turn into costs. The activation of the Far East policy in response to deterioration of geopolitical conditions is the most evident reaction of the state trying to increase its potential by the access to new resources and new markets. Moreover, it may indirectly indicate the accumulation of problems with resource deployment and the tendency to get access to new sources of revenue. The theoretical analysis shows that this is wrong and it leads to aggravation of the overexpansion crisis. Any model of “complete” development of the region involves extensive expenses related to the development of local resources and the creation of appropriate infrastructure, the establishment of effective control over local bureaucracy and participants of foreign exchanges. Furthermore, according to the research, it is clear that the main methods of region management (both public investments and measures for private capital attraction) lead to accumulation of costs. A well-known cyclicity of the Far East policy can be explained by the described mechanism of accumulation of costs.

Keywords: Far East, regional policy, state, geopolicy, infrastructural power, development programs of the Far East.

Nikolai Silaev, Moscow State University for International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, Russia. E-mail: nikolai.silaev@gmail.com.
The beliefs that there is a cleavage between the North Caucasus and the rest of Russia are based upon politicized narrative of “the North Caucasus peculiarity”. This narrative blocks the substantial analysis of the differences of this region. The article observes the theoretical and methodological approaches for such analysis. It suggests that the notion of “traditional society” often applied to the North Caucasus region cannot provide convincing explanation for the empiric facts. However, such advanced conceptions as Douglas North’s theory of “open access” can hardly be applied towards the North Caucasus as well. The article offers the analytical frame explaining the regional differences which focuses on the processes of the establishment of power monopoly (N. Elias), building citizenship as a stable relationship between individual and society (Ch. Tilly) and expansion of infrastructural power of the state (M Mann). The approach is also based upon theoretical and empirical results of V. Volkov’s research of “violent entrepreneurship” and latent fragmentation of state institutions in Russia. The assessment of infrastructural power of the state can be based on such markers as elimination of alternative centers of force and spread of citizen participation. Implying the approach to the problem of local and regional differences can be fruitful for the study of the North Caucasus and other regions in a broader context of the political transformation in Russia.

Keywords: the North Caucasus, citizenship, regional comparisons, regional political transformations.

Sergei Ivanov, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS, Vladivostok, Russia. E-mail: 02isa02@mail.ru.
The article analyzes the policy of the central authorities of the PRC towards the development of the northeastern provinces in 2000—2010s. The author criticizes the economic approach to explaining Beijing’s motivation, studies the statistics of financial injections into the Northeast, highlights key representations of the central and local elites on the problems of regional development and measures to overcome them. The article shows that the implementation of the strategy of the revival of the Northeast was caused not only by economic reasons. The central authorities believed that the key problem of the regional economy is the old thinking of local elites, and it is enough to impose another system of values to spur social and economic development. Through the implementation of the strategy for the revival of old industrial bases, Beijing tried to encourage local authorities to act more decisively in reforming state enterprises, and the economic bureaucracy to follow the market laws and learn to work in a competitive environment. The article regards regional policy in the Northeast as a modernization project of central government to interfere in the local system of relations between the authorities and economic elites. This view makes it possible to explain why Northeast has not become the area of attracting of state financial resources. The state budget and banks have only reduced the financing of the Northeast in comparison with other Chinese regions. Increased financial resources were channeled only through investments of central departments and state corporations in fixed assets of the Northeast in the 2000s, but not in the 2010s. Many tax and administrative preferences for the Northeast were short-lived and were extended to other parts of China in few years after their adoption.
Keywords: China, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin, regional policy, old industrial bases.

Ivan Stavrov, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS, Vladivostok, Russia. E-mail: stavivan@yandex.ru.
The article is devoted to the policy of the Chinese state regarding the development of the north-eastern region of the country. The aim of the research is to study the policy of revival of the old industrial base of Northeast China as well as to identify the main stages of its development. An analysis of the documentary base showed that the policy of the revival of Northeast China went through a difficult path of formation. It was possible to trace quite clearly three of its periods, which partly coincide with the traditional stages of socio-economic planning of the PRC. At the same time, these periods are qualitatively different from each other. In the first period (2003—2007), a new policy was formed, which was formalized in the Strategy for the Revival of the Northeast and other old industrial bases. The second stage occurred during the period from 2007 to 2015 and was fixed in two Plans for the Revival of Dongbei and the 11th and 12th five-year plans of the People’s Republic of China. During this period, the general provisions of the strategy were supplemented by a system of indicators for the socio-economic development of the Northeastern region. The third period is formalized in 2016, when the new government course was fixed in the 13th five-year plan and other documents of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council.

In terms of content, the policy of the Revival of Northeast China was aimed at pulling Dongbei to the level of the developed provinces of the East region of the PRC. The government intended to achieve this goal through a set of measures, such as restructuring state-owned enterprises, increasing the share of the tertiary sector (services sector), and creating high-tech industries. With the development of policy, there was a gradual digression from quantitative development indicators and an increase in qualitative indicators, many of which were achieved. Nevertheless, the maintenance of stability in the region (especially during the global crisis of 2008) was largely ensured by significant infusions from the center and not by a fundamental reorientation of the economy, which actually caused a gradual departure from the policy of the revival of the north-eastern region during the rule of Xi Jinping and his team.

Keywords: PRC, Northeast China, regional policy, policy of revival of old industrial bases, regional socio-economic development.

Ilya Chubarov, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: ilya.chubarov@gmail.com.
Ekaterina Mikhailova, Faculty of Geography, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia; Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia. Email: mikhaylovaev@yandex.ru.
The article looks at the Sino-Russian borderland as a cross-border region and characterizes its demographic and urban features, as well as its place in strategic doctrines and bilateral agreements of Russia and China. Due to differences in administrative division of neighbouring states we suggest four possible layers of cross-border region: one macro-level (with total inclusion of border regions), two mezzo-levels (one with Chinese districts and another with Chinese counties as counterparts of Russian municipalities) and one micro-level (that encompasses administrative units that accommodate border crossing points). Depending on the layer of cross-border region, the Sino-Russian borderland may cover area from 3.5 mln km2 to 211.000 km2 with population varying from 95 mln to 3.6 mln inhabitants. This implies that if one compares demographic features of the Russian and Chinese parts of borderland, the latter will be 17 times more populous than the former at the macro-level, 8.7 times more populous at the district mezzo-level and only two times more populous at the county mezzo-level. Based on comparison of strategies and plans of territorial development, we reveal that recent governmental policies focus on the micro-level of cross-border region. Both sides expect four urban areas that are the most populous and the closest to the border to become growth poles of the cross-border region.
Keywords: Sino-Russian border, cross-border region, Russian Far East, North-East of China

Sоren Urbansky, Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany. E-mail: s.urbansky@lmu.de.
This article examines the 1950s as the period of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Union and China and its impact on shared border and the people populating in the border cities of Manzhouli and Zabaikal’sk (Otpor). After 1945, cross-border contact, especially in the area of international passenger and cargo trade had unquestionably grown stronger again. A vehicle for transit, however, the railroad functioned as a narrow corridor that hardly affected its surroundings. Consequently, the rail line facilitated expansion of international flow of people and commodities, whereas local and informal forms of border trade did not rejuvenate under the regime of the two communist states. Official friendship rituals at both border railroad stations, if celebrated with hollow phrases in the press, did also not bring the people on the Argun closer to one another. When locals from across the border came to pay a visit, their trips had been approved and neatly choreographed by government bodies well ahead of time, to prevent informal encounters between ordinary border dwellers. Thus contacts between the Soviet and Chinese people were no longer spontaneous but ritualized. Ultimately, then, such official displays of harmony reaffirmed the borders between nations rather than mediating them. Locals from the Chinese and Soviet borderlands no longer found common ground, upon which could have developed local transborder identities to countering the nationalistic ones.
Keywords: Soviet Union, China, Soviet-Chinese relations 1950—1960, cross-border relations.

Alexey Tokarev, Center for Global Problems of the International Research Institute of MGIMO-University, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: a.tokarev@inno.mgimo.ru.
The author conducts a comparative study on successful cases of secession in the post-Soviet area supported by Russia and analyzes the role of geography in these cases based on 24 indicators. Those political entities that initially claimed autonomy or seceded, but later were reintegrated, lie outside of the scope of the study, the following cases being the object of research: unrecognized Transnistria, the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, the Republic of Crimea which was independent for a single day in March 2014, as well as partially recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 24 indicators are grouped in four variables: 1) common border with the patron-state of the secession and its features; 2) the features of the border with the original state: natural vs. artificial; 3) geographical features of the seceding territory; 4) the features of the dispersal of dominant ethnic group of the seceding entity and that of the titular nation of the original state on the seceding territory. The analysis of these variables helps to understand how geographical conditions influence the outcome of a secession, facilitate or impede reintegration. The author avoids thinking solely in the paradigm of environmental determinism for the way people use space is more important than its features. However, the factor of economic geography is not considered because economic indicators had no significant impact on the outcome of the cases of secession discussed in this paper. These cases are divided into two groups based on the likelihood of their success provided that the patron-state reduces or ceases its support. Abkhazia and Crimea fall into the first group since they are well protected by their geographical features from militarily forced reintegration by the original state. The Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, Transnistria, and South Ossetia are placed in the second group because in the long run their geographical features will foster their reintegration with the original state, which does not have to be done applying military force.
Keywords: Transnistria, the Lugansk People’s Republic, the Donetsk People’s Republic, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, secession, post-Soviet space, patron-state, de facto state, Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia.

Pavel Lapin, Russian Embassy in China, Beijing, PRC. E-mail: waijiao2000@mail.ru.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, following the growth of the Russian-Chinese contacts and the integration of the Qing Empire in the new system of international affairs, Russian language and translation schools were established in this Eastern state. Their main goal was to train the experts in the Russian language in order to develop bilateral military and diplomatic, trade and economic connections. The central authorities and, with rare exceptions, local military leaders and civil administrations were the initiators of such educational institutions.

The authorities paid special attention to the border territories of the Qing Empire where Russian language experts were in higher demand. Moscow led active foreign policy in the Far East as well as near Chinese borders where the authorities had to react on these processes, to control attentively the plans of the Russians that was impossible without the Russian language experts. One of such schools was Hunchun translation school of the Russian language which was opened in the northeastern Chinese province of Jilin near the Russian border. In spite of the fact that this school existed for quite a short period of time and was closed due to the lack of money and complicated political situation, it laid the basis for the spread of the Russian language and the training of the translators and interpreters in this part of the Chinese empire, provided the accumulation of administrative and teaching experience which was used to open new Russian language schools there in the future.

Keywords: Russian language in China, Russian language teaching, Qing Empire, Russian-Chinese humanitarian relations.

Egor Razumov, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS, Vladivostok, Russia. E-mail: razumov.egor@gmail.com.
The article considers the evolution of China’s policy in the field of information security and cybersecurity based on the legislative framework, official governmental documents such as doctrines and strategies, special programs of development, press materials and speeches of the President of the People’s Republic of China’s Xi Jinping. The increasing role of information technologies poses new challenges to the country, which include attempts of foreign actors to conduct cyber espionage against government institutions, companies and citizens. This list also includes the intention of the opposing side to destabilize critically important information infrastructure. The aim of this article is to evaluate the cybersecurity which is organized by the Chinese government as well as to define the tendencies in perception of threats of the national security in infosphere among the representatives of the political elite. The article reviews the structures of China’s state machine in the context of cybersecurity. Despite the noticeable actions of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders, there is no single organization which can be in charge for the political course in the field of information. In addition to the Central Military Commission, there are two more branches who are responsible for that: Chinese Communist Party and China’s State Council. The structure of the last two authorities copy the structure of the one in the Armed Forces. The Central leading group for cybersecurity and informatization holds a special place in China’s cyberspace. There is a tendency in the legislative system of the Chinese system to strengthen its technological potential in the information sphere in order to catch up with the developed countries, particularly the United States of America; to implement information technology in the production process and people’s lives; to change the current restrictive model to the model of the gradual opening of Chinese information segment.
Keywords: information security, cybersovereignty, infosphere, China, Xi Jinping.

Yana Piskareva, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS, Vladivostok, Russia. E-mail: 7yana7@mail.ru.
The article is devoted to the study of the ceramic cutout vessels which were found at the early medieval archeological sites in Northeast China, Priamurye, Primorye and the Zabaikalye Territory. The territory distribution of these vessels corresponds to the area of the Mohe archaeological culture in the Far East, the new discoveries of similar goods are connected with the sites at the downstream of the Shilka river. The main characteristics of such goods which make them unique artefacts are a deep cutout on one of the sides and a flattened body with an oval bottom. The purpose of these vessels is still a subject of discussion among the researchers as well as the reasons of its wide spread in the territories which are directly related to the Tungusic population or its influence. The article considers the functional use of these vessels, their spread and origin. The author marks the lack of soot and snuff as well as line traces of wear on the surface of the most goods. Taking into consideration the standardized sizes of vessels, distinctive features of their form, the author concludes that they could have been used in everyday life for shelling the grains and sorting the grain before its use. The presence of these vessels at rather distant and diverse sites can indicate the similar household type of population when the need of certain operations brought to similar technical solutions.
Keywords: cutout vessels, early Middle Ages, Mohe, Primorye, Priamurye, Northeast China.

Yelena Astashenkova, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS, Vladivostok, Russia. E-mail: astashenkova@mail.ru.
Aleksandr Ivliev, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS, Vladivostok, Russia. E-mail: ivliev@mail.primorye.ru.
The process of formation and development of the Jurchens was under the permanent influence of the Kitan Liao Empire. After the conquest of vast areas of the former Kitan Empire, the Jin Empire (1115—1234) inherited the polyethnic population with a rich culture which image was determined by preferences of its former masters — the Kitan people. The Liao influence on the Jurchens and the Jin appeared in political, economic and cultural spheres and it was reflected in both historical records and archaeological materials. This paper examines the archaeological evidence of contacts between the Kitan and the Jurchen cultures. It allows retracing them in such spheres of culture which were usually not mentioned in written sources. The contacts are traced in pottery traditions, town planning, architecture, armament, in items of everyday life and objects of decorative and applied art: bronze mirrors and miniature stone sculptures. One part of the items specific for the Kitan and the Liao culture were simply preserved by the Jurchens, but another part represents further creative development of adopted samples. Unfortunately, the current state of the available archaeological materials doesn’t allow solving questions about the types of selected contacts: whether it was just the use of the Liao items, their imitation or further creative development based on the Liao samples. Such questions will be clarified with the help of new data. The goal of the authors is to show the availability of the contacts.
Keywords: Liao Empire, Jin Empire, Jurchens, Kitans, material culture, architecture, decorative and applied art.

Wilhelm K. Essler, Institute of philosophy, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany. E-mail: willy.essler@t-online.de.
From the translator
We would like to present a translation of Wilhelm Essler’s lecture, which he gave at Wuhan University (People’s Republic of China) on September 27, 2012.

The scholars from the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East and from other institutes of the FEB RAS had an opportunity to meet Professor Essler in late August and early September, 2016 in Vladivostok. He presented his paper at FEB RAS Presidium and delivered a series of lectures at the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS (the site of FEB RAS, YouTube).

Wilhelm Essler is a world-renowned expert in modern logic, philosophy of science and epistemology. His scientific and teaching career started at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich in the 1960s. Since 1979, he has been teaching at Goethe University Frankfurt where he has been repeatedly elected as Head of the Philosophy Department and Dean of the Institute of Philosophy.

Over the years, Wilhelm Essler has published more than ten monographies and a great number of articles, which contributed much to the development of logic and philosophy of science. He is also concerned with early Indian and Buddhist philosophy including Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. In his lecture W.K. Essler sums up his decades long experience as a researcher and a professor and gives an account of how private goals of a scholar transform into an endeavor to broaden horizons, to go beyond one’s own field of research and to master spiritual and intellectual achievements of other cultures. From a very personal point of view he discusses the alleged self-sufficiency of the contemporary Western philosophy and shows how the attitude of self-sufficiency inevitably results in spiritual and intellectual constraints that hinder a sincere and open-minded philosophical inquiry. These constraints can be overcome first through the study of the history of the Western philosophy itself, and second through a careful examination of other philosophical traditions, in particular the Indian und the Chinese one. For W.K. Essler, it was especially the study of the early Buddhist philosophy that helped him to broaden his philosophical perspective. In the presented paper he combines the discoveries in metalogic with his research results in early Indian and Chinese philosophy and tries to do so from the insider’s point of view as he takes effort to understand the way of thinking typical of these cultures. Such an open philosophizing enables a different appreciation of philosophy, a deeper insight into spiritual foundations and principles common to all philosophical traditions. The inquiry into the common principles of philosophizing also transforms the personality of the philosopher in an important way: through the interest in others one achieves self-knowledge, and through the self-knowledge one learns to know and to accept others.

We assume that such approach can be of interest not only for comparative philosophy but also for the theory of intercultural communication, which studies the peculiarities of cultural interaction in the Pacific Rim countries.

Keywords: philosophy, history of philosophy, Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, reflection, self-knowledge.